Riccardo Redaelli
Milan, Italy, October 2, 2024
Iran’s leadership faces a dilemma: maintain the regime’s survival or escalate its proxy war against Israel, risking broader regional conflict.
The violent attack by Hamas a year ago, followed by Israel’s intense retaliation – largely disregarding the humanitarian situation for Palestinians – has raised concerns about a potential broader regional conflict.
Such a conflict could draw in international powers and change the indirect confrontation between Israel and Iran to something far more serious
For Iran’s political and security elite, defeating Israel without triggering an existential threat to the Islamic Republic has been a long-standing dilemma, often met with grand declarations that are more rhetorical than effective.
The refusal to recognise Israel’s right to exist is a pillar of the ideology of the Nezam, the Iranian post-revolutionary system of power. But the primary concern for Tehran is ensuring the survival of the system itself, which faces existential threats from multiple directions: the United States, Sunni Gulf monarchies, the alleged “plots” of the Jewish lobby, and internal opposition.
Iran’s ‘ring of fire’ against Israel
Iran’s vulnerability is exacerbated by two self-inflicted weaknesses— strategic isolation and a deep-rooted sense of being under siege.
From a purely military perspective, the Islamic Republic of Iran faces significant limitations due to the outdated nature of its conventional armed forces, which include an ageing air fleet and obsolete army equipment.
In response, Tehran has pursued an asymmetric and hybrid strategy, focusing on both deterrence and offensive capabilities.
Central to this strategy is the Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC), which has become a powerful military-industrial entity.
The IRGC has accumulated a large stockpile of advanced missiles and drones, which have proven effective in both proxy conflicts and the war in Ukraine.
Iran has also established a network of IRGC-backed Shi’a resistance militias (also known as Ring of Fire”) modelled after Hezbollah in Lebanon, and extended its influence across the Middle East, particularly in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
This expansion was facilitated, in part, by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which destabilised the region and provided fertile ground for Iranian influence.
The ‘Axis of Resistance’
A key figure in Iran’s geostrategic expansion was General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, creating and coordinating this network of militias and militant groups.
These groups, forming the backbone of what is referred to as the “Axis of Resistance” operated under Soleimani’s careful control. He adeptly balanced their local agendas with Iran’s broader strategic objectives, particularly in relation to Israel.
Soleimani’s strategy was to weaken Israel indirectly through a series of proxy threats rather than engaging in direct military confrontation. With Iranian support, groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen continually eroded Israeli security.
This approach allowed Tehran to avoid direct retaliation while maintaining a steady campaign of deterrence against Israel.
Soleimani became a shahid (martyr) after being assassinated by the United States in January 2020, further solidifying his legacy within the Islamic Republic. However, his death dealt a significant blow to the IRGC and Iran’s strategic apparatus. His ability to maintain cohesion across these militias has been difficult to replicate, and while these groups are not mere puppets of Tehran, Soleimani’s leadership has been key in aligning their activities with Iran’s strategic goals.
The Gaza War as a strategic changer?
The IRGC was initially suspected of being involved in planning the October 7, 2023 attack, but subsequent assessments suggest Iran’s role was less direct than first thought.
Moreover, the so-called “Shi’a Axis of Resistance” – comprising Iran’s allied militias across the region – showed reluctance to fully engage in the conflict alongside Hamas.
Pro-Iranian militias have launched limited attacks on Israel, aiming to distract it with multiple fronts, but they have so far avoided escalating the conflict significantly, partly due to disagreements over the best strategy.
Israel, however, has escalated tensions with Iran through provocative actions, such as the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus in April, airstrikes on Hezbollah officials in Beirut, the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in August and, in September, the detonations across Syria and Lebanon of hand-held communication devices used by Hezbollah members, causing 37 deaths and thousands of injuries, and the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Hasrallah.
Some analysts believe Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to provoke regional escalation, while others see these actions as an attempt to deter Iran and its proxies from deeper involvement.
This strategy echoes the “mad dog” doctrine, articulated by Israeli General Moshe Dayan in 1967, suggesting that Israel should appear unpredictable and aggressive to deter its enemies.
While this approach has worked for decades, the region now faces a critical question: What happens when there are two “mad dogs” at play?
In a significant shift, Iran decided to retaliate directly in April, launching drone and missile strikes on Israeli territory.
Though largely symbolic, this marks a departure from Iran’s earlier reliance on proxy forces (the already described “ring of fire” approach). The shift reflects both internal dynamics and foreign policy considerations in Tehran.
The Iranian dilemma
Historically, Iran’s priority, especially for the IRGC, has been to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic, with a “securitisation” of all Iranian policies. Iran’s strategy has been to project power across the Middle East through aggressive defensive actions.
However, recent developments indicate a shift toward a more aggressive posture. Internal factors, including the rise of a younger generation of more assertive IRGC commanders and the sidelining of moderate factions within Iran’s political elite, have influenced this shift.
This new generation appears more willing to engage in direct retaliation against Iran’s adversaries, even at the risk of sparking a broader conflict.
Not all factions within Iran’s political and military elite adhere to this radical posture. In August, following the assassination of Haniyeh and Hezbollah commanders, Iran chose not to respond with immediate retaliation.
Both Iranian and Hezbollah leaders appear uncertain about the consequences of such a strike, and they are carefully considering the regional balance of power as well as Iran’s own vulnerabilities.
Despite strong rhetoric, neither Hezbollah nor Iran seems eager to risk provoking a larger military confrontation with Israel or the United States. Their missile and drone arsenals, while formidable in asymmetric warfare, are inadequate against a full-scale Israeli airstrike or US intervention.
Three factions on court
Within Iran’s leadership, three main factions have emerged.
The first, dominated by hardliners and many IRGC members, advocates for direct retaliation against Israel to prevent the regime from appearing weak.
A second faction, while also supporting retaliation, is concerned about the risks of provoking US involvement in a broader war.
The third faction, led by President Mas’ud Pezeshkian and his moderate supporters, opposes retaliation altogether, hoping restraint will lead to diplomatic and economic gains, improving Iran’s relations with Europe and the United States especially if Kamala Harris wins the upcoming US election.
At the regional level, Gulf monarchies, including Saudi Arabia, have offered cooperation and investment to Iran, on the condition that Tehran refrains from escalating the Gaza conflict into a broader war.
An opportunity for diplomacy
The complex dynamics of the Middle East often lead to pessimistic forecasts, yet the current situation presents an opportunity for the West to engage constructively with Tehran.
Historically, a policy of isolating and demonising Iran has only strengthened the IRGC and hardliners, marginalising moderates and reformists within the regime.
A more nuanced approach from Western powers, aimed at supporting President Pezeshkian’s efforts to reduce Iran’s isolation, could help promote stability and open diplomatic avenues.
Riccardo Redaelli is a Professor of History and Institutions of Asia at the Catholic University of Sacred Heart in Milan. The above article and photograph, which appeared on the website of 360info, have been published under Creative Commons.
